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Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment:
Firms Versus Agents
Keith N. Hylton*
ABSTRACT: Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two
groups of actors for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and
penalties against the violatingfirm's agents. Here, I examine the economics
ofpunishing agents versusfirms. My area of applicationis antitrust, but the
argument applies generally to otherfields in which the government has the
choice of punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that
whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in
some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishmentfor its agents,
the firm can almost always induce its agents to carry out the illegal act. It
follows that almost any plausibleeffort to use penaltiesagainstagents to deter
pricefixing can be undone by thefirm's own system of rewardsfor agents. For
deterrence, penalties against the firm sufficient to eliminate the firm's
incentive to fix prices are necessary.
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IOWA LAW REVIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two systems of penalties for
deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the
agents of the violating firm. One of the main differences between the United
States and the European Union enforcement regimes is that the U.S. relies
more on penalties against agents to deter violations, while the E.U. tends to
rely more on penalties against the firm., In the U.S., an antitrust violation can
result in a fine against the firm and a prison sentence for the agents who
carried out the anticompetitive actions. In the E.U., a fine against the firm is
2
the sole punishment in the vast majority of cases.
The penalty structure in the U.S. persists even though Gary Becker, in
1968, argued quite forcefully that a policy of using monetary fines against
firms would be more efficient than the existing U.S. punishment system.3
Monetary fines can be imposed with relatively little cost to society and would
amount to a transfer of resources from the convicted firm to the government,
where it could be used to compensate victims. Prison sentences, by contrast,
impose a cost on society in two ways: by taxing the productive sector of society
to pay for the agent's upkeep during incarceration and by forfeiting the labor
of the convicted agent. At least some of the agents convicted of Sherman Act
violations are experienced and productive workers within their industries.4
Becker suggested that it would be better to let them continue to work,
deterred from future antitrust violations by the threat of large fines, than to
lock them up in prison cells for several years.5
The question of optimality in punishment has come to the fore recently
with discussions of revising the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 6 Douglas

1. Douglas H. Ginsburg &Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, COMPETITION POL'YINT'L,
Autumn 201o, at 3, 20; see also GREGOR ERBACH, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., EU AND
US COMPETITION POLICIES: SIMILAR OBJECTIVES, DIFFERENT APPROACHES (2014),

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2o 14/1

4

available at

077 9 /LDM-BRI (20

14) 1 4 0779_REV1_EN.pdf; Donald I. Baker, Deterring Cartels-The Criminalization Dimension
1 (Mar. 23, 2012 ) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/
documents/2o 12-0 3 -23%2oBaker%20-%2oDeterring%2oCartels-%2oThe%2ocriminalisation

%2odimension% 2o-%2opaper.pdf.
2. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 1, at 17-19.
3.

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193-98

(1968).
4. SeeUnited States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 515484, at * 16 (N.D. Ill.July 15,
1999). The vice chairman of Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and two former executives
were sentenced to prison terms after being convicted of price fixing. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Denso Corp. Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Automobile Parts
Installed in U.S. Cars (June 30, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_
releases/2o 14/3o6795.pdf.
5. Becker, supranote 3, at 193-98.
6. In June 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a notice in the Federal
Register that it is conducting a study of the penalties for antitrust offenses, including examination
of the fine provisions governing bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation agreements.
Proposed Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,409 (June 2, 2014). For public
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Ginsburg and Joshua Wright recently proposed a shift toward greater
punishment for the agent by debarring convicted agents from work in their
fields.7 John Connor and Robert Lande have argued that the preferable
reform would not pile more punishment on agents, but would penalize firms
more.8 They find that penalties in the U.S. are too low to provide optimal
deterrence against cartels.9 Cartels persist, in their view, because the rewards
are greater than the expected penalties.- °
In this Essay, I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms."
My area of application is antitrust, but the arguments apply generally to other
fields in which the government has the choice of punishing the agent, the
firm, or both. The theory that I set out is part normative and part positive.
The normative part demonstrates that whenever the firm has an incentive,
given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in
relatively modest punishment for its agents, it can almost always induce its
agents to carry out the illegal act. This proposition applies especially to price
fixing, which incurs a combination of firm and relatively modest agenttargeted penalties. It follows that almost any plausible effort to use penalties
against agents to deter price fixing can be undone by the firm's own system
of rewards for agents. Similarly, the firm can almost always eliminate the
agent's incentive to price fix whenever it does not have an incentive to fix
prices (that is, the firm-level expected penalty is greater than the profit from
price fixing). The normative implication of these propositions is that
penalties against the firm sufficient to eliminate the incentive to fix prices are
necessary in order to deter price fixing. The positive part of the analysis
explains observed patterns in punishment, such as the plea agreements firms
negotiate with the Department of Justice defining which employees are
subject to criminal punishment after the firm has been found to have fixed
prices. In particular, the observed tendency to impose prison sentences on
mid-level employees may result in part from a rational response on the part
of firms in assigning agents to carry out price fixing schemes and later
exposing those agents to prosecution in plea negotiations.

comments in response to the notice, see Letters Received in Response to Request for Public Comment on
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N (July 29, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/amendmentProposed Priorities,
process/public-comment/public-comment-july-2 9-2014.
7.
Ginsburg & Wright, supra note I, at 22.
8. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 435-42 (2012).
9. Id. at 429.
id. at 470-73.
See, e.g.,
10.
1 1. For more legal scholarship on this issue, see generally Daniel Sokol, Policingthe Firm, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 785 (2014). See also Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An
Economic Analysis of the CriminalEnforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,69 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. 715, 735-37 (2001) (discussing agency costs of cartel enforcement); Giancarlo Spagnolo,
ManagerialIncentives and Collusive Behavior, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501, 1515-16 (2005) (finding
that incentives of managers to smooth income may enhance cartel stability).
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INCENTIVES TO COMMIT ANTITRUST CRIMES

I start with a simple economic model of crime. The model consists of one
firm and one agent. To be committed, a crime will need the assistance of the
agent.
The firm is assumed to be profit-maximizing and risk neutral, which
means that it will commit the crime whenever the expected net gain from the
crime is positive. Thus, the firm will commit the crime whenever the gain to
the firm from the crime is greater than the expected penalty (the probability
of firm punishment multiplied by the fine imposed on the firm). Though this
seems to put too little weight on internalized ethical norms, competitive
markets tend to weaken the internalization of such norms. In the extreme
case of a zero-profit, perfectly competitive environment, firms will have to
adopt the cost-cutting methods of their rivals in order to survive even if those
methods may be unlawful.
The agent is assumed to be utility-maximizing. Thus, the agent will
compare his utility in the state in which he does not commit the crime to his
utility in the state in which he does commit the crime. If his expected utility
is lower in the state in which he commits the crime, he will not commit the
crime. The converse holds too. In short, the agent will commit the crime
whenever his expected utility from compliance with the law is less than his
expected utility from commission of the crime. This generates four incentive
scenarios to consider:
Table 1. Firm Versus Agent Incentives to Commit Crime

Gain to firm from
crime less than
expected penalty

Expected utility from
compliance greater than
expected utility from
commission

Expected utility from
compliance less than expected
utility from commission

Both Firm and Agent comply

Firm complies,
Agent commits

Firm commits,
Agent complies

Both Firm and Agent commit

Gain to firm from
crime greater than
expected penalty

Each of the cells in Table i summarizes the firm and the agent's
incentives. Consider each cell in turn. In the first cell (top left), the firm's
gain from the crime is less than the expected penalty, and the agent's
expected utility from the crime is less than his expected utility from
commission. Both agent and firm comply with the law.
The second cell (top right) shows a conflict: the firm prefers to comply
with the law and the agent prefers to commit the crime. In other words, the
firm expects to suffer a net loss from the crime, while the agent expects to

20151
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gain in utility. How could this scenario arise? First, it arises because the
expected penalty to the firm exceeds its gain from the crime. In addition, it
arises because the agent expects a net gain from committing the crime and
does not expect the firm to respond by eliminating the gain to the agent. This
might occur for several reasons. The firm may have weak internal controls
and may be unable to identify and punish the agent who has caused it to suffer
a penalty. If the firm is unable to identify the agent, it may be forced to choose
between terminating or punishing all or a large group of employees, or
forgoing any effort to discipline the responsible agent. If the cost of
identifying and punishing the responsible agent exceeds any deterrence gain
to the firm, it may forgo the discipline step and leave itself exposed to future
decisions by agents to commit crimes that harm the firm. The second reason
this scenario might arise is that the firm cannot credibly commit to impose a
penalty that would deter the agent. The agent may have options to leave,
perhaps to rival firms, before the firm can impose the penalty, or the agent
may provide services that are so important to the firm that penalizing the
agent would leave both the firm and the agent worse off.Is

The other conflict scenario is where the firm prefers to commit the crime
and the agent prefers to comply. The firm needs the agent to commit the
crime; the firm cannot act on its own. Here, it seems quite plausible that the
firm could rearrange its compensation structure to give the agent an incentive
to commit the crime. If the agent prefers not to commit the crime because
the expected penalty exceeds any gain he might receive, the firm canjust offer
to increase the agent's wage, conditioned on committing the crime. Hence,
the outcome in which the firm prefers to commit the crime and the agent
does not can quickly turn into the outcome where both the firm and the agent
willingly commit the crime.
A.

AGENT UNDERDETERRENCEPROBLEM

Now closely consider these scenarios and take into consideration features
of the antitrust legal environment. Suppose the agent is risk neutral. He
therefore commits the crime if and only if his gain from committing the crime
is greater than the expected penalty. The expected penalty in antitrust is the
prison term imposed under the Sherman Act, reduced by the probability that
the agent will be detected and prosecuted. The average prison sentence under
the Sherman Act for price-fixing defendants is now 25 months-roughly two

12.
On the other hand, one suspects that if the agent continually imposes a loss on the firm,
eventually the firm will identify him as the source of the loss and discipline him. If the firm sets a
penalty that is sufficiently harsh, then punishment much later in the employee's tenure may still
be a sufficient deterrent. For now, my point is that a conflict in incentives may be observed-at
least in the short run-where the employee commits a crime that harms the firm.

IOWA LAW REVIEW

2074

[Vol. 1oo:2o6 9

years.'3 Thus, the penalty that the agent expects to receive, if he is detected
and prosecuted, is the loss of wage income for two years.
What is the expected gain from price fixing for the agent? If the firm
rewards the agent for the extra profits that his price fixing brings in, then his
gain is the reward given by his firm (or by another firm that hires the agent).
If the firm does not reward the agent, then the agent's expected gain from
price fixing is negative, since he takes the risk that he will be imprisoned and
receives nothing in return.
To begin, the relevant time frame can be broken into two periods: (1) the
punishment period, which is the period during which the agent would be
imprisoned if apprehended; and, (2) the post-punishment period. For the
average agent, the punishment period lasts two years. The reward for price
fixing can be given in both the punishment period and the post-punishment
period.
To examine this question more closely, let z= probability of detection, w,
= wage during punishment period, w2 = wage during post-punishment period.
Let r represent the effective rate of interest (or discount rate) between the
two periods. In addition, let any increase in the wage be represented by Aw.
The net gain that the agent gets from commission of the crime is therefore:

+
+ 0
' -z)A11 '
Pf~Wf~d

P~b~fpow Vde 1=

l+r
. V

(1)

P~putbtm~i fbdnvad

The first term reflects the punishment period wage loss suffered by the
agent-that is, the wage loss suffered by the agent if detected and punished.
The second term reflects the agent's gain if the agent goes undetected and
receives a reward from the firm for price fixing (or for the financial returns
to the firm resulting from price fixing) during the punishment period. The
third term reflects a post-punishment reward provided by the firm. In this
expression, Aw, is the reward in the punishment period and Aw, is the reward
in the post-punishment period. The firm controls the rewards in both periods.
But the probability of detection is not under the control of firm; it is
determined by antitrust enforcement agencies.
B.

FIRM PREFERS TO FIx PRiCEs

Suppose the firm prefers to fix prices and gives the agent a constant
reward percentage in both periods. Let that percentage be represented by A.
Suppose also that wage growth is qjpercent between the two periods. The
agent's gain from price fixing is therefore:

13.
Antitrust Division 2013 CriminalEnforcementUpdate, U.S. DEP'TJUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/division-update/2 o13/criminal-program.html (last visited May 13, 2015).
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equivalently:

(F I01

-

+2

7

z+ (1+ r) Iw

,(
2

Clearly, if the reward for price fixing is zero (A = o), then the agent's net
gain is negative. In that case, he will not have an incentive to fix prices. Hence,
the reward factor must be positive for the agent to have an incentive to fix
prices.
To examine how plausible it is that the agent might prefer to or be
induced to engage in price fixing, consider the table below, which calculates
the necessary reward percentage for different combinations of the probability
of detection, wage growth, and interest rate. I chose detection probabilities
that reflect upper (.25) and lower ranges (. 15) for cartel detection in the U.S.
and in Europe. The lower estimate (. 15) was suggested by the empirical study
of Peter Bryant and Woodrow Eckard in 1991.'5 Since then, leniency
programs have generated much more information about cartel activity,
raising the probability of detection substantially. Ginsburg and Wright argue
that the probability of detection may be as high as .25 with leniency taken into
,6
account.

14. The last term of the agent's gain expression follows because Aw, (in expression (i)), is
equal to Aw}, because the reward factor is the same in both periods, and Awh is equal toAk(i+i)w,.
15. Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) (finding that the probability of detection range in the U.S. is
between 13 and 17%); Emannuel Combe et al., Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the
European Union 21 (Bruges Eur. Econ. Research, Paper No. 12, 2oo8), available at http://Econ
Papers.repec.org/RePEc:coe:wpbeer:s 2 (estimating that the probability of detection in the E.U. is
between 12.9% and 13.2%); Peter L. Ormosi, How Big Is a Tip of the Iceberg?A ParsimoniousWay to
Estimate Cartel Detection Rate 21 (Ctr. for Competition Pol'y, Working Paper No. 11-6, 2ol 1),
available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/en-GB/c/documentjlibrary/get. file?uuid=186cco
ec-a536-4o6d-9792-6o3f 4 fTed95c&groupId=107435 (estimating that the probability of detection
in the E.U. is between io% and 20%).
16. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 1, at 8. However, a recent empirical study suggests that
the probability of detection for pricing fixing is still within the low range of 13%-17% in spite of
the introduction of leniency programs. See Alla Golub et al., The Profitability of Price Fixing:
Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions Deterred? 5 (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract= 188515.
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Table 2: Reward Necessary to Induce Price Fixing by the Agent
Detection
probability

Interest
rate

Wage growth
percentage

Break-even
reward
percentage

.25

.01

.02

.14

.12

.13

.18

.13

.02

.08

.12

.o8

. 18

.07

.15

.01

The numbers in Table 2 indicate that as the probability of detection falls,
the reward percentage necessary to induce the agent to fix prices falls too. As
wage growth increases relative to the interest rate, the reward necessary to
induce the agent to engage in price fixing falls.
Table 2 suggests that it is not difficult for the firm to encourage the agent
to commit the crime. In many of the scenarios considered in Table 2, a
modest compensation premium, sometimes on the order of 15% of
compensation, is all that is necessary to induce the agent to commit the crime.
The key factors that tend toward the inducement of a violation are the wage
reward for the violation, the interest rate (low interest rates make the second
period payment more valuable), and high wage growth (relatively high wage
in the post-punishment period). All that the firm needs to do is credibly
communicate these factors to the agent and the agent will have the incentives,
desired by the firm, to violate the law.
Nevertheless, this analysis is incomplete because it fails to include the
disutility of imprisonment, over and above the loss of wage income.
Incorporating this factor would not be difficult, but it would not change the
basic message of this analysis. That is, the firm can easily induce the agent to
commit the crime.17 This is the case even if the agent risks jail time. Offsetting

17. Incorporating the disutility of punishment would be equivalent to increasing the
punishment period wage loss by some multiple greater than one. Suppose that multiple is k >1.
Then the agent's incentive to fx price becomes:

[Q-z)A-zc+

117

(0+ r)

WI-

It should be clear that the basic issues raised in the preceding analysis remain. The break-even
reward percentage is higher in this case, but if the disutility factor k is not too large, the firm will
still be able to induce the agent to fix prices with a relatively modest reward.
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the effect of this omission is the additional omission from this analysis of a
payment from the firm to the agent during the period of punishment, if he is
apprehended. The law does not clearly prevent a firm from compensating an
imprisoned employee during his prison term.' 8 If the firm continues to
compensate the agent during the punishment period while he is imprisoned,
the incentive to commit the crime may be considerably greater than this
analysis suggests.'9
C. FIRMDOES NOT PREFER TO FIx PRICES
Now, let's consider the other potential conflict scenario, where the firm
does not want to fix prices but the agent has an incentive to fix prices. For this
to be the case, the agent must perceive a positive net reward from price fixing
(which means, using (1), (1 - z)A - z + A(i+i)/(i+r) > o). Given the risk of
punishment to the firm, the firm can easily eliminate the agent's incentive to
price fix by eliminating the reward for price fixing. It follows that if the firm
sets the reward for price fixing (A) at zero, the agent will not fix prices.o
However, the relationship between the firm and the agent may be more
opaque than this analysis suggests. The agent may be employed under a
compensation structure that rewards him for any increases in profits to the
department in which he works. Thus, if he engages in price fixing, he will be
rewarded even if the firm has no incentive to fix prices. In this case, the agent
may be induced to fix prices by the within-firm compensation structure, even
though the firm suffers as a result of his actions.
If the firm can identify the agent who is responsible for incurring the
price-fixing penalty, the firm will have an incentive to penalize that agent in
order to discourage this and other agents from price fixing. If the firm can
detect the responsible agent immediately, the firm can terminate the agent.
The threat of certain termination would eliminate the agent's incentive to fix
prices.
Suppose, however, the firm cannot detect the responsible agent until the
post-punishment period. Now, the firm can only respond to the discovery that
the agent engaged in price fixing by imposing a penalty on the agent in the

18.

Connor & Lande, supra note 8, at 440- 4 1 n.54.

If the firm continues to pay the agent during the period of punishment, the net gain
from committing the violation is:
19.

20+17
This gain is positive.
2o. This conclusion is not safe if agents switch firms in the post-punishment phase. The
second firm might reward the agent for price fixing in the earlier period. Thus, even if the agent's
initial firm sets the reward for price fixing at zero, another firm may choose to reward the action,
which could give the agent an incentive to fix prices in the first period.
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second period. For example, the firm could terminate the agent in the second
period. If the firm terminates the agent in this second period with probability
s, the agent's incentive to fix prices becomes:

I

z)A-z+(-s)
-(1+L

AO +

)

+-

-

.

(3)

The third term reflects the reward the agent receives in the second period if
he is not detected by the firm and the last term reflects the loss the agent
suffers if he is detected by the firm, then terminated in the second period.21
The last term reflects the assumption that if the agent had not engaged in
price fixing, he would have earned the normal return from his career. By
engaging in price fixing, and being caught and terminated, he loses that
return in the post-punishment period. If this expression (3) is positive, the
agent has an incentive to fix prices. It is easy to show that this incentive
condition is positive when the reward for price fixing, A, is greater than the
odds of detection by the enforcement authority, z/(1-z), and also greater than
the odds of detection by the firm, s/(i-s).22

This condition implies that the termination threat by itself is insufficient
to deter the agent from price fixing. However, the firm can reduce the agent's
incentive to fix prices by reducing the reward for the agent's impact on
current-period profits (A), increasing the probability of firm detection (s), or
by increasing the relative wage in the post-punishment period (qi). The lower
the reward and the greater the wage growth, the stronger the disincentive is
to go against the employer's policy of legal compliance. Thus, consistent with
Gary Becker and George Stigler,-s the firm can deter agent malfeasance (in
this case, price fixing) through a combination of dismissal and a steeper wage
profile.

21

.

This formulation assumes that there is no connection between the firm's dismissal policy

and the enforcement authority's punishment decision. It may seem more realistic to assume,
instead, that the firm will definitely detect and dismiss any agent who is detected and punished
by the authority. Under this assumption, the agent's incentive condition is:
[(1-z2-z+(-z)[(-$)(-]+]7)
1

(I+r)]

This expression delivers the same message as the expression in (3) examined in the text.
22. The reason is that the incentive condition in (3) is equivalent to:
[(1-z)2z+[(l- (1-s]
7)

23. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 5 (1974).
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INCREASING THE SENTENCE

One response to the underdeterrence problem identified here is to
increase the length of the sentence imposed on the agent. If the sentence is
increased sufficiently, the agent's incentive to engage in price fixing can be
eliminated.
Expand the model to three periods, two periods of punishment and one
post-punishment. Now the net reward for the agent becomes:

(I1+ r)

2

I

As Table 3 below shows, although it is less likely that the agent will have
an incentive to fix prices, given the longer prison sentence, the firm can still
easily find reward levels that induce the agent to fix prices. The required
reward levels necessary to induce price fixing unsurprisingly increase after the
sentence length is increased. Still, there appears to be nothing that prevents
the employer from completely offsetting the greater deterrence effect-due
to the increased sentence-with a greater reward for violating the law. For
example, if the detection probability is 0.25, the interest rate is o.o 1, and wage
growth between periods is 2%, a compensation reward of 29% or more would
be sufficient to induce the agent to fix prices.
Table 3: Reward Necessary to Induce Price Fixing Where an Enhanced
Sentence Is Likely
Detection
probability

Interest
rate

Wage growth
percentage

Break-even
reward
percentage

.25

.01

.02

.29

.12

.27

.18

.26

.02

.16

.12

.15

.18

.15

.15

.01

One possible answer to the agent underdeterrence problem is to increase
the expected sentence to the point where it is extremely difficult for the firm
to undo the deterrence effect of the threatened sentence. While increasing
the sentence is a possible solution, it runs into several constraints. First, for
any plausible increase in the sentence, the firm can probably undo its
deterrence effect by increasing the reward to the agent, or by steepening the
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wage profile. The sentence length would have to be increased by a large
amount in order to prevent the firm from undoing its deterrence effect.
However, increasing the sentence by a factor of five, say from an average of
two years in prison for price fixing to an average of ten years, would be difficult
to get courts to accept, after having sentenced within a certain range for many
years.2 4 Certainly defendants would challenge such sentences as
disproportionate, given the nature of the harm caused by price fixing. A
sentence scheme that puts price fixers in prison just as long as most violent
criminal offenders would be difficult to defend against proportionality
challenges.25 The average prison sentence for murder is 149 months (12
years) and the average prison sentence for kidnapping is 104 months (nine
years) *26 Increasing the sentence for price fixing to ten years would result in
price fixers serving longer sentences than many convicted murderers.
These figures suggest that the sentence enhancement proposal is unlikely
to be a practical solution to the problem of firms being able to undo the
deterrent effect of punishment for price fixing. It is too easy for the firm to
undo the deterrence effect for reasonable sentence enhancement levels.
Moreover, to prevent the firm from undoing the effect would require the sort
of increase in sentences for price fixing that would invite challenges to those
sentences based on fairness and proportionality in criminal punishment.
E.

DEBARMENT

Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua Wright propose debarment as a solution
to the agent underdeterrence problem.27 Under the debarment approach,
the agent would be barred from returning to work in his industry in the postpunishment period.
Being debarred from returning to the industry, the agent will suffer a loss
to the extent that his within-industry wage in the post-punishment period, w2,
exceeds his wage level working outside of the industry, w.. It is plausible that
this loss would be substantial, because the agent's within-industry wage will
reflect the value of his experience in the industry-that is, the market value

24. The Sherman Act expressly grants the court discretion to impose a sentence not exceeding
ten years for price fixing. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Courts, exercising this
discretion, have imposed sentences averaging two years. Precisely how courts could be induced
to impose maximum sentences under the Sherman Act is not obvious. Perhaps if the maximum
sentence were increased to 20 years, courts might tend to impose longer sentences because of
the greater difference between the maximum and the recent historical average, but this is pure
conjecture.
25. Specifically, defendants would challenge substantially longer sentences for price fixing
as unconstitutionally excessive, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See generally Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (91o). On comparative
excessiveness as a basis for invalidating sentences, see Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishmen 9 1 VA. L. REV. 677, 727-30 (2005).

26. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISON SENTENCES AND TIME SERVED FOR
VIOLENCE 1 (1995), availableat http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/PSATSFV.PDF.
27. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note i, at 3.
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of industry-specific human capital. The debarment incentive changes the
agent's incentives primarily by reducing the value of the promise of a postpunishment reward from either the firm or the industry. Under debarment,
the agent's net reward is therefore:

z U1+r)
-W)J +01-4

%

.+(+)wl-

(5)

Wdsarbd

Because of the debarment threat, the agent loses his first period wage
and the premium over his outside-industry wage in the post-punishment
period. However, if the agent is not detected, he gains his reward for price
fixing in both periods. Moreover, if the difference between the agent's withinindustry and outside-industry wage is trivial, the debarment threat is quite
weak.
Debarment, like increasing the sentence, makes it less likely that the
agent will commit the crime. However, its effect on the agent can be undone
by the firm if the firm or the industry makes the reward for price fixing (A)
sufficiently large. In other words, by promising the agent a sufficiently large
wage increase if he avoids detection, the firm can largely maintain the agent's
incentive to engage in price fixing after the debarment sanction is adopted
under the statute. To see this point in terms of the parameters used earlier,
note that (5) can be rewritten as:

+

+ZI)

(KI lir/ l+r

This implies that if the firm can set the reward for price fixing (A) greater than
the odds of detection, z/(i-z), then it can guarantee that the agent will still
have an incentive to engage in price fixing even when facing the threat of
debarment.
I have assumed, conservatively, that the firm does not compensate the
agent if he is detected and punished, during the punishment phase. However,
if the firm compensates the agent during the punishment period28 and
provides a reward if he escapes punishment, the deterrent effect of
debarment can be largely eliminated.
III. SOME POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS

In addition to revealing the ease with which a firm with an incentive to
fix prices can induce its agents to carry out the acts of price fixing, this

28. Connor & Lande, supra note 8, at 440-41 n.54 (noting reports that some companies
continue to pay convicted agents while they are in prison).
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framework explains some of the puzzling features noted about prison
sentences. Most prison sentences in antitrust are imposed on mid-level
employees, well below the top level of management.2 9 Carve-out
agreements-negotiated plea deals by the firms in which they specify certain
employees for prosecution-tend to sacrifice mid-level employees of the
firm.3o What explains this pattern?

Return to the incentive analysis of the preceding Part. First, the set of
potential agents suitable for prosecution will tend to be either mid-level or
senior. Junior employees will seldom be in a position to arrange or direct a
price fixing agreement with rival firms. A mid-level agent, unlike a senior
agent, can be rewarded by the firm after he completes his (typically two-year)
sentence. Senior agents would need a more substantial reward to induce price
fixing because they have more at risk. With the prospect of such a reward in
view, the threat of prosecution against mid-level employees can easily be
undone by the compensation policies of the firm. Thus, the U.S. sentencing
data probably reflect the rational economic response of firms that have
incentives to engage in price fixing to the enforcement policies of the Justice
Department. The firms can induce mid-level employees to break the law then
carve them out for later prosecution in plea deals. To the extent that such a
strategy reduces the expected sanction against the firm, it could tip the
incentives of some firms in favor of price fixing. In other words, if in the
absence of a carve-out strategy the firm would not have an incentive to fix
prices, the option of a carve-out strategy coupled with a reduced sanction on
the firm might change the firm's incentives toward preferring price fixing.s,
IV. CONCLUSION

A statute, such as the Sherman Act, that imposes penalties both on the
firm and on the agent generates the possibility of a conflict in which one party
will have an incentive to violate the statute while the other party does not. The
basic message of this paper is that the conflict scenario in which the firm has
an incentive to violate the statute but the agent does not is much more
worrisome than the reverse scenario. The firm has many tools at its disposal
to discourage the agent from violating the statute when the firm prefers to
comply with it. However, if the firm has an incentive to violate the statute, it

29.

Id. at 44o-41.

30. Id.

31. In perhaps the most cynical of possibilities, cartel recidivism could be privately optimal for
both firms and the enforcement agency. Suppose fines are sufficiently high to deter firms from
price fixing, but firms expect to negotiate for lower fines by carving out mid-level agents for
prosecution. An equilibrium might arise in which the firm's expected sanctions are too low to
deter, largely because the firm anticipates carving out employees for prosecution, and the
enforcement agency profits from collecting fines from recidivists. More generally, if the fines are
not set sufficiently high to deter the firm from price fixing, one might observe a recidivism
equilibrium, where both the firm and the enforcement agency profit from recidivism. On
evidence of antitrust recidivism, see Sokol, supra note 1i, at 792-93.
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can almost always induce its agent to violate the statute. This implies that the
preferable approach to deterrence is to make deterrence at the firm level a
higher-priority concern than deterrence at the agent level.
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